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Ten Years after Accession:
State Aid in Eastern Europe
Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch and Johannes Stephan*
In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEEC) have pursued far-reaching vertical and individual industrial policy with a
focus on privatisation and restructuring of traditional industries. Foreign investment from
the West and the facilitation of the development of a market economy also involved mas-
sive injections of State support. With their accession to the European Union (EU), levels and
forms of State aid came under critical review by the European Commission. Now that a first
decade has passed since the first Eastern enlargement in 2004, this inquiry investigates how
State aid policy in the CEECs has developed during the last ten years and whether the inte-
gration of the new Member States operates on a level playing field with respect to State aid.
The findings suggest that once having entered the EU as full members, the new members
from the East appear to have been converging into rather stringent competition cultures.
I. Introduction
In the early 1990s and towards the start of the tran-
sitionphase, Central andEasternEuropean countries
(CEECs)1 relied upon public sector outlays to pro-
mote industrial restructuring. State aid included e.g.
tax incentives for investors, the establishment of spe-
cial economic zones, with the additional aim to sup-
port inflows of foreign investments from the West.
Since 2004, eleven CEECs joined the EU in three
waves of enlargement. Membership in the European
Union (EU) provided further access to structural
funds, but at the same time accession countries were
also obliged to adopt and enforce the acquis commu-
nautaire and thushad to complywithEuropeanState
aid rules. The integration of the new Member States
has comeunder critical reviewby theEuropeanCom-
mission and their government support in the form
of themany kinds of State aid that countriesmay use
or have been using.
An earlier analysis2 reveals that the effectiveness
of implementation of competition law and policy in
general and the intensity of competition do appear
to run lower for CEECs compared to the EU-15 coun-
tries. The inquiry presented here aims to clarify
whether this comparatively lower level of perfor-
mance goes hand in hand with State aid being grant-
ed more generously (with less supervision, scrutiny,
and lower levels of accountability) in the CEECs.
Röller andHirschhausen expectedmajor implications
regarding the assessment of State aid measures in
former socialist countries, having in mind the expe-
rience fromEast Germany.3CEECs also have a strong
tradition of government intervention resulting from
the planned economy system. Even at the dawn of
EU accession, their level of public support to certain
industries and individual firms was significantly
higher than in the EU-15Member States. Three years
after the 2004 accession with ten newmembers join-
ing, a study by Hashi et al. found that “the general
philosophy [regarding State aid policies, own addi-
tions] does not appear to have changed fundamen-
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1 In the context of this article, Central and Eastern European coun-
tries are the following ten Member States of the European Union
which joined in the first and second Eastern enlargement waves:
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Croatia as the most
recent Member State is also subject to this study but displayed
seperately.
2 Hölscher/Stephan, Competition and Antitrust Policy in the
Enlarged European Union: A Level Playing Field? J.C.M.S. 2009,
47(4), pp. 863-889.
3 Röller/v. Hirschhausen, State Aid, Industrial Restructuring and
Privatization in the New German Länder: Competition Policy with
Case Studies of the Shipbuilding and Synthetic Fibres Industries,
Discussion Paper FS IV 96-13, 1996 WZB Berlin.
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tally since the accession”.4 The authors inquire
whether government intervention in the form of
State aid influenced industrial competitiveness, and
find that competitiveness is not improved by State
aid policies. Rather, competitiveness is driven by
firms’ own efforts.
Since 2004, eleven CEECs joined the EU in three
waves of enlargment. Thus, the first decade has
passed since the first Eastern enlargement with eight
new Member States from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope.5 The aim of this study is to assess whether in-
dustrial policies before and after accession were con-
siderably more pronounced in the East to thereby
challenge the European State aid regime or whether
the alledged lax enforcement in the new Member
States isamyth.TheanalysishencereviewshowState
aidpolicy in theCEECshas developed after accession.
Following the first introductory chapter, section
two places State aid into the context of EU competi-
tion policy, whereas section three broaches the issue
of CEECs industrial policies. This section further pro-
vides stylised facts of State aid in a comparative per-
spective providing an overview of the development
of a competition culture comparing the ‘old’ EU-15
with the new Member Countries. This quantitative
analysis is based on a careful evaluation of statistics
and data provided by the European Commission and
national authorities. Section four discusses State aid
practice in the Member States with a focus on the
different types of aid and whether the aid conforms
to the strategy of less but better aid. Section five eval-
uates the adequacy of current procedureswith a view
on a level playing field for doing business in the Eu-
ropean Union. Finally, the developments of the Eu-
ropean shipbuilding industry are presented by
analysing exemplary cases in which State aid deliv-
ered to shipyards in the West and East was declared
unlawful. This delivers a concincingly clear pricture
of the effectiveness of State aid control in the EU
Members of the East.
II. State Aid Law in the European Union
Since its enactment in 1958, the EC Treaty always
contained rules regulating industrial policy and the
provision of State aid. The primary function of such
a control is to ensure a free competition between en-
terprises from different Member States on the com-
monmarket. In general, State aid is prohibited if the
aid measure is granted through State resources and
if it could distort competition in the internal market.
However, there are also exemptions from the prohi-
bition with a view to balance competition and trade
considerations against thewider objectives of the EU
(e.g. economic and social cohesion). The general
block exemption regulation (GBER6), which was in-
troduced in 2008, is a case in point by relaxing the
rules where aid measures address horizontal objec-
tives (e.g. aid for research and development (R&D),
environmental aid).7
Thepower of State aid regulation in theEU is firm-
ly allocated to the European Commission’s Direc-
torate General Competition. All State aid measures
have to be notified to the Commission and can only
be put into effect after having been authorised by the
EU.Where the Commission regards ameasure as not
compatible with State aid rules, it will come to a neg-
ative decision. Firms that already received aid with-
out EU consent may be liable to paying it back, if the
aid proves illegal and incompatible.
In 2005, the Commission published a so-called
State aid Action Plan (SAAP8) with the objective of
‘less and better targeted State aid’. Its objective was
to encourage Member States to reduce their overall
volumes of State aid, whilst redirecting State aid re-
sources towards objectives with a clear community
interest. The attitudes towards State aid were influ-
encedby theLisbonAgenda,with theCouncil ofMin-
isters taking a growing interest in the scale and effi-
ciency of government intervention. This is pro-
nounced in the objective of ‘less aid, but better’.9
4 Hashi/Hajdukovic/Luci, Can Government Policy Influence
Industrial Competitiveness? Evidence from Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic. in: Hashi/Welfens/Wziatek-Kubiak (eds),
Industrial Competitiveness and Restructuring in Enlarged Europe.
How Accession Countries Catch Up and Integrate in the Euro-
pean Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 51.
5 Malta and Cyprus also joined the EU in 2004 but are not subject
of this study as these two countries have no history as centrally
planned economy. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007,
and the most recent Member State, Croatia, just joined the EU in
2013.
6 Regulation 800/2008, OJ 2008 L 214/3.
7 This contribution will not analyse the usefulness or consistency of
the GBER. Such an analysis would not contribute to the objec-
tives targeted here, because these rules apply both to East and
West to the same extent. Whether they had been applied more or
less in East or West is of interest here.
8 See Commission Press Release No. 680/05, 7 June 2005.
9 Wishlade, EU State Aid Control, in: Clarke/Morgan (eds): New
Developments in UK and EU Competition Policy, Edward Elgar,
2006, at p. 233.
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Thus, the notation of ‘better aid’ comprises public
support directed at projects focusing on R&D, envi-
ronmental issues or support for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME).
Even though the amount of State aid in Europe
has steadily declined over recent decades, the level of
State aid in someMember States is still considerable.
In some cases, State aid is not even well targeted at
the Lisbon objectives and hence may threaten a lev-
el playing field in the European common market.
III. State aid in Central and Eastern
Europe
In the East European centrally planned economies,
State aid had been an essential instrument: bud-
getary subsidies were necessary to compensate firms
for the losses incurred by producing under a distort-
ed price system. At the beginning of the transition
period, these subsidies were reduced in line with
price liberalization. However, the decline of bud-
getary subsidies was paralleled by the emergence of
a series of indirect and less transparent formsof State
support to inefficient firms and sectors; State aid has
become an important instrument during the process
of economic transformation in most CEECs.10 In
these times, governments supportedenterpriseswith
massive injections of State aid.11 Yet, the bulk was
not connected to any long-term development policy
but to rescuing enterprises in difficulty in order to
‘speed up the adjustment process and rescue asmany
enterprises as possible’. This wasmotivated to a large
extent by political and electoral considerations.12
Rescue and restructuring policies of the early transi-
tion period may be described as unplanned, reactive
and non transparent and had a strong ‘crisismanage-
ment’ feature: “[o]pen and hidden subsidies flowed
to some enterprises and sectors even when it was es-
tablished that many of them had no future in a com-
petitive market economy and had to exit anyway.”13
Thus, there has been a tremendous misfit between
post-communist State aid practices and the State aid
policy of the European Union14 with its subsequent
equally tremendous need for adjustment of State aid
rules according to the acquis communautaire in the
pre-accession period.
10 Atanasiu, State Aid in Central and Eastern Europe, W.Comp.
2001, 24(2), at p. 263 et seq.
11 Hashi, The Comparative Analysis of State Aid and Government
Policy in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 2004, Center
for Social and Economic Research, Working Paper.
12 Hashi, op.cit.
13 Hashi, op.cit., at p. 3.
14 Blauberger, European State Aid Control in the New Member
States – The Examples of Poland and the Czech Republic, Paper
prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial Conference, Montreal
17–18 May 2007.
Figure 1: Total State aid*, 2000–2011
* Less agriculture, fisheries and transport, as % of GDP (excluding crisis measures).
** CEEC includes Bulgaria and Romania from 2002 onwards only.
Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2011; Annual Report 2011 by the Croatian Competition Agency.
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This policy change was initiated with the begin-
ning of the accession negotiations with the EU. The
CEEC’s commitment to adapt national State aid poli-
cies according to European rules dates back to the en-
try into force of the Europe Agreements.
The Europe Agreements contained State aid pro-
visions closely following the model of the EC Treaty
(general ban), which instructed the CEECs to elimi-
nate State aid if it distorted trade with the EU and to
make their State aid expenditures transparent.15 Pri-
or to their accession, all CEECsadoptednationalState
aid legislation and established national competition
authorities since theCommissionwasnot authorized
to decide on State aid issues until accession of the
CEECs. Those national State aid rules and enforce-
ment authorities served as a learning and test arena
for the time after EU accession: ‘Harmonisation in
this context takes on a specific character, one that is
more about learning to play the game than about bor-
rowing rules’.16 Still, this did not necessarily result
in a competition culture already comparable to the
old EU Member States. In fact, the amount of State
aid granted in the CEECs exceeded the intensity that
was common amongst the EU-15 Member States: in
the year 2000, total State aid amounted to some 1.1%
of GDP (measured in purchasing power standard)
amongst the CEECs against only 0.4% amongst the
EU-15 (Figure 1). The gap even increased until 2003,
peaking at 1.9% versus 0.4% in the West. In the fol-
lowing years, the aid level among the CEECs con-
verged toWestEuropean levels, even if it still remains
somewhat higher (0.5% in 2011) than in the EU-15
countries (0.4% in 2011). In the youngest Member
State, Croatia, this peculiar development is mirrored
with a three year delay, but the amount of State aid
relative to GDP still remains twice as large as in the
other CEECs. The following years will showwhether
EU accession will bring substantial changes in the
level of State aid in Croatia, as observed amongmost
CEECs.17
There are other important variations between
CEECs regarding State aid levels: Croatia, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Slovenia
are at the higher end of the spectrum, whilst Estonia,
Bulgaria, and Lithuania offer much less aid to their
industries (Figure 2): CEECs are not at all homoge-
neous in this respect.
These differences may already raise the prelimi-
nary expectation that State aid policy in some CEEC
Member States is, in general, more lenient than in
the West. Institution-building, importance attached
to FDI with the expectation of international technol-
ogy transfer, the apparent difficulties in negotiations
with the EU over the acquis communautaire, and a
playing field with respect to competition policy
slightly tilted towards the East18 all serve to nourish
this assumption. Further, the intensity of use of State
aid in industrial policywill in general tend to bemore
pro-active in economies with larger productivity
15 Atanasiu, op.cit., at p. 259.
16 Cremona, State Aid Control: Substance and Procedures in the
Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ments, E.L.J. (2003) 9(3), at p. 287.
17 See Kesner-Skreb, What will happen to state aid in Croatia after
EU accession?, Institute of Public Finance Zagreb, No. 70-2012.
18 Hölscher/Stephan, op.cit. and Hölscher/Stephan, Competition
policy in Central Eastern Europe in the light of EU accession,
J.C.M.S., 2004, 42(2), pp. 321-345.
Figure 2: Total State aid* for CEECs, 2004–2011
* Less agriculture, fisheries and transport, as % of GDP.
Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2009; Annual Report 2011 by the Croatian Competition Agency.
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gaps, lower sectoral diversity or adjustment to inter-
national division of labour and structural flexibility
in general. Whilst this comparative issue is rather
underrepresented in the literature,19 and no clear an-
swer can be given so far, the compliance literature in
other policy-fields does maybe surprisingly suggest
that there isnosignificant lag in institutional enforce-
ment amongst the CEECs: they find a good pattern
of transposition of EU law into national law in the
four investigated CEECs but rather flawed enforce-
ment (which incidentally could also be observed in
two old Member States, namely Italy and Ireland).20
On the other side, evaluations of innovation poli-
cies in CEECs suggest that their emergence after EU
accession largely followed the same pattern as in
WesternEurope (the countries do generate very good
basic research, alas they lack positive results in terms
of commercialisation of research results or inven-
tions).21Furthermore, the application of instruments
even produced a much stronger horizontal bias than
was common in Western Europe at the same time.
This may be attributed both to the way that policy
makers in the East apparently understood EU State
aid regulations,22and toageneralneo-liberalperspec-
tive and macro-policy bias of policy makers during
the early 2000s.23 Both interpretations tend to sug-
gest a tendency towards a level playing field. Yet, this
issue remains undecided, and it is the task of the fol-
lowing sections to test this by providing a quantita-
tive overview and by way of qualitative analysis. The
results generated are rounded off by a review of a
particularly insightful case study.
IV. State Aid Practice
In terms of the objectives of State aid, the European
Commission distinguishes two broad categories: sec-
toral and horizontal State aid. Sectoral aid is consid-
ered to be an important instrument in the course of
restructuring and privatizing State-owned enterpris-
es.24 State aid for horizontal objectives, i.e. not grant-
ed to a certain industry sector but to R&D or envi-
ronmental projects for all industries alike, is consid-
ered as being better suited to addressmarket failures
and thus less distortive than sectoral aid and thus
largely synonymous with ‘well-targeted’ State aid.25
Regional aid is classified by the European Commis-
sion as ‘horizontal’, suggesting such aid is in linewith
the shift to more broadly-based objectives. However,
much of regional State aid ends up in the hands of
individual firms and investors.26
In the mid Nineties, only around 50% of aid was
granted for horizontal objectives in the old Member
States. As it was one of the key Lisbon purposes to
redirect State aid towards horizontal objectives, this
share increased rapidly in the EU-15 countries. In the
CEECs, data only exists from the year 2000 onwards:
here, the share of horizontal aid decreased prior to
accession. After accession, the share increased rapid-
ly and reached a level of 50% in 2007. Yet, the share
of horizontal aid in EU-15 Member States amounts
to more than 60% since 2005 (Figure 3). The level of
sectoral aid fell enormously after accession but still
exeeds the EU-15 level: in 2011, CEECs spent 18% of
aid to sectoral objectives whereas in the EU-15 Mem-
ber States the share of sectoral aid amounted to on-
ly 9%. In 2011 regional aid accounted for 39% of all
aid in CEECs and 25% among the EU-15 Member
States.27
Disparities between East and West before acces-
sion can be explained in part by the restructuring of
industries in order to reach viability and to complete
privatization. Furthermore, CEECs took advantage of
the transitional rules and the rules on existing aid,
19 Blauberger, Compliance with rules of negative integration:
European state aid control in the new member states, J.E.P.P.,
2009, 16(7), pp. 1030–1046.
20 See e.g. Falkner/Treib, Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The
EU-15 Compared to New Member States, J.C.M.S., 2008, 46(2),
pp. 293-313.
21 See e.g. Kattel/Reinert/Suurna, Industrial Restructuring and
Innovation Policy in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990,
2009, Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic
Dynamics No. 23, the other canon foundation, Norway and
Tallinn University of Technology, at p. 25.
22 Reid/Peter, Sectoral Innovation Systems – The Policy Landscape
in the EU-25, 2008, Final report for the project Europe Innova
initiative (www.europe-innova.org) of the European Commission’s
Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General, Brussels.
23 See e.g. Kattel et al., op.cit., at p. 25)
24 Ellison, Competitiveness Strategies, Resource Struggles and
National Interest in the New Europe, Paper prepared for the
EUSA Ninth Biennial Conference, Austin 31 March-2 April 2005
at p. 26.
25 European Commission, “State Aid Scoreboard” (Autumn 2005
update), at p. 19.
26 Ellison, op.cit., at p. 25.
27 The distinction of aid between horizontal and secoral objectives
is not always exact. This holds especially for CEECs: prior to
accession their national authorities were the sole source of
information (e.g. aid to the national railway companies could
have been reported as sectoral or, in order to act in line with EU
policies, as horizontal for employment aid). Furthermore, there
are concerns that not all aid was reported, especially tax and
social contribution arrears (Hashi, op.cit., at p. 12).
EStAL 2 |2014310 Ten Years after Accession
agreed upon in the accession negotiations. The pre-
vious more lenient treatment of State aid became
more difficult after accession as the CEECs had to
comply with the European State aid rules. Thus, in
several Member States, the last chance for sectoral
aid was exploited. After accession, the speed of ad-
justment of national State aid policies however dif-
fered between CEECs. Horizontal policies in general
did not generate much interest in Poland as com-
pared to other countries prior to accession. State aid
in Poland had a bias on large enterprises with a share
of around 60%.28 The Polish government seemed to
give precedence to national policy goals over Euro-
pean State aid policy (most prominent examples in-
clude the shipyards, see case study in section six).29
Other CEECs, as Estonia and Slovenia, reached a
share of horizontal aid above 75%already in the year
2000. The government in Estonia always spent pub-
lic support solely for horizontal measures.
However, comparing the allocation of aid mea-
sures among the Member States shows that the
largest differences exist between North-West and
South-East Countries. Whereas the countries in
Northern Europe (including the Baltic States) spend
28 Blauberger, op.cit., fn. 19, at p. 163.
29 Blauberger, op.cit., fn. 14, at p. 25.
Figure 3: Share of Horizontal, Regional and Sectoral Aid in EU-15 and CEEC*, 2000-2011
* Bulgaria and Romania from 2002 onwards.
Source: European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard, Own Calculations.
Figure 4: Distribution of Horizontal Measures in EU-15 and CEEC*, 2000–2011
Source: European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard, Own Calculations.
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nearly 100% of all aid to horizontal measures like
R&D and environmental protection, the countries of
Southern Europe allocate a large proportion of aid to
sectoral or regional objectives. And Croatia also
seems to follow this scheme. Situated in the South-
East of Europe the majority of state support (73% in
2011) is granted to sectoral aid measures with a focus
on shipbuilding and transport while horizontal aid
accounts for only 15% and regional aid for a mere
8%.
In 2005, the Commission published a so-called
State aid Action Plan (SAAP) with the objective of
‘less and better targeted state aid’. It shall encourage
Member States to reduce their overall State aid lev-
els, whilst redirecting State aid resources to objec-
tives with a clear community interest. ‘Better aid’ in
this sense comprises public support directed at
projects focusing on research and development
(R&D), environmental objectives or support for small
and medium-sized enterprises (SME). The share of
these objectives in EU-15 Member States and CEECs
is represented in Figure 4. Whereas the share of aid
for R&D projects and environmental issues consis-
tently increasedamong theEU-15MemberStates, the
largest attention in CEECs still is focused upon em-
ployment aid. Furthermore, the share of SME sup-
port programmes decreased rapidly since 2008
amongCEECs. During the transitionphase, SMEpro-
grammes assumed a central role in all post-commu-
nist governments: the expectationwas that SMEs are
key players in amarket economy, as they can respond
quickly to market signals and thereby help to pro-
mote competitiveness.30
Regardless ofwhether the SAAPhas produced any
more suitable environment for the governance of
State aid is of course a matter of debate, but that re-
mains beyond our objectives here. Our interest, fo-
cussed upon a comparison between East and West
has produced a clear message: the line of division
does not run East-West, it appears to run North-
South.
Contrary to such ‘better aid’, European govern-
ments regularly grant aid to individual firms in or-
der to rescue or restructure companies in difficulties.
This clearly is among themost distortive typeof State
aid: State aid to rescue ailing companies typically
does not result in their restructuring but rather pre-
vents market adjustments that are or will become
necessary at some point, because inefficient compa-
nies are artificially kept in the market at the cost of
competitive firms. Prior to accession, the level of such
rescue and restructuring (R&R) aid had been high
among most CEECs. Hashi reports that in Poland,
20% of all aid in 2001 and even 23% in 2002 were
used for this objective.31 And yet after accession, the
level of R&R aid dropped sharply to a level even low-
er than among EU-15 Member States (Figure 5). Of
course, one has to bear inmind that R&R aid is some-
times supposed to be reported under employment
30 OECD, Industrial Policy in OECD Countries, 1992, Annual
Review.
31 Hashi op.cit.
Figure 5: Rescue and Restructuring aid* (R&R), in million €, 2003-2011
* without crisis measures.
Source: State Aid Scoreboard: Statistical Tables, Autumn 2012, Own Calculation.
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schemes, e.g. in Poland in 2000: R&R aid amounted
to only 7% whereas employment aid levelled at
24%.32 Thus, the total amount of R&R aid might be
higher. From a country perspective, in the period
2006 to 2011, Poland and Romania spent the highest
amounts in attempts to rescue or restructure individ-
ual companies. Among the EU-15 Member States
France,UK, andAustriahad thehighest levelsofR&R
aid.
V. Law Enforcement
Another indicator for the establishment of a level
playing field in State aid is the number of decisions
taken to open formal investigations on individual
State aid incidences. Such in-depth investigations are
started if the Commission has doubts about the com-
patibility of an aidmeasurewith the objectives of the
common market. A decision to open a formal inves-
tigation must already summarise the relevant issues
of fact and law. It furthermust be preceeded by a pre-
liminary assessment as to the aid character of the
measure and set out the Commission’s doubts in
more detail.
The share of State aid cases, in which a prelimi-
nary assessment was followed by a formal investiga-
tion procedure, significantly fell after 2004 and in
2011 reached a mere 2% in comparison to over 30%
in 2004 (Table 1). Yet, huge differences among the
CEECs exist: whereas the share in Romania, Hun-
gary and Poland is above average (26%, 12% and
10%), other Member States were not yet confronted
with a formal investigation procedure at all (Lithua-
nia). Some of these formal investigation procedures
concern State aid measures adopted before acces-
sion. Yet, although the CEECs already established
State aid enforcement prior to accession the Com-
mission had doubts as to the compatibility of certain
measures.33
As Table 2 shows, the share of un-notified aid is
lower in the case of the CEECs as compared to the
old EU-15. As it can be assumed that the EU Commis-
sion and not least competitors will keep a close eye
on State aid granted, this does indicate that the gov-
ernments inCEECsplayby the rules. This ismirrored
in the share of negative decisions, which is also low-
er in CEECs than in the EU-15 countries (2.6% com-
pared to 5.5%).
We should not expect the EU Commission to take
a more permissibly stance towards State aid in the
CEECs: since accession, DG Competition released 17
negative decisions34 regarding State aid measures in
CEECs. Thereof, 10 cases required recovery of unlaw-
ful aid. The 17 decisions concerned aid measures in
Poland (6), Hungary (6), Slovakia (3), Bulgaria (1) and
32 Hashi, op.cit., at p. 16.
33 Kuik, State Aid and the 2004 Accession. Overview of Recent
Developments, EStAL 2004, 3(3) pp. 365-373.
34 The observation period ended on 31/12/2011.
Table 1: Formal Investigation Procedures in CEECs*, Years 2004–2011
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
State Aid Proceedings 46 113 124 80 95 103 88 41 632
No objections 9 72 115 55 72 112 92 64 591
Formal Investigations 14 06 13 7 10 9 5 1 65
Share of Formal In-
vestigations 30% 5% 10% 9% 11% 9% 6% 2% 9%
* only procedures of DG Competition. Agriculture and Fisheries are not included.
Source: State Aid Register (Online Database). Own Calculations.
Table 2: Share of Positive and Negative Decisions, Share of Un-notified Aid, Years 2000–2011
Positive* Negative Un-notified aid
EU-15 94.5% 5.5% 13.6%
CEECs 97.4% 2.6% 9.1%
* This figure includes not only “positive decisions”, but also all other decisions with a positive outcome (e.g. Art. 4(3)
decision not to raise objections)
Source: State Aid Register, own calculations.
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Romania (1). Most of these cases concern the restruc-
turing of companies (8) or sectoral development (3),
both objectives which are assumed to causemost dis-
tortionary effects on competition.
The following section will discuss in more detail
selected State aid cases in the shipbuilding industry.
The latter has gone throughmajor structural changes
during the past decades. Increasing competition
fromAsia forced the European industry to enormous
adjustments regarding the number of employees and
the strategy of each shipyard. During that timemany
European Governments supported their shipbuild-
ing industry with massive State injections. Thus,
many of thesemeasureswere subject to State aid pro-
ceedings by the European Commission and will be
subject in the next chapter.
VI. The European Shipbuilding Industry
For the last couple of years, the European shipbuild-
ing industry had to cope with fierce competition
mainly from Asian shipyards. The industry boomed
at the end of the nineties and at the beginning of the
new millenium which made the shipbuilding indus-
try attractive for new entrants mainly from Asia. In
South Korea and China several new shipyards
opened doors. However, at the end of 2008, the finan-
cial markets collapsed, also affecting the entire mar-
itime sector. TheEuropean shipbuilding industryhas
lost more than 25% of its employees since 2007 (Fig-
ure 6). The largest number of lay-offs occured in
Poland and the UK.
Yet these overcapacities and the rapidly increased
market shares of Asian competitors tempted Euro-
pean governments to grant national shipyards oper-
ating aid above the regular ceilings.35 Thus, it is not
astonishing that European shipyards are consistent-
ly subject to formal investigation procedures regard-
ing the legality of State aid measures.
Since 2000, the European Commission released
more than 90 decisions concerning aid measures in
favour of individual shipyards in the EU. In 23 cas-
es, public support aimed at rescuing or restructuring
a shipyard in difficulty, 11 of theses cases ended with
a negative decision by the Commission, as the aid
measure was not in line with EU rules. Reasons lead-
ing to these negative decisions often include a not
fully implemented restructuring plan and unrespect-
ed capacitiy limitations (Hellenic Shipyards36,
Kvaerner Warnowwerft37).
Figure 6 also shows that the shipbuilding indus-
try is vitally important for the Polish economy. Yet,
compared to the old Member States, and prior to ac-
cession of CEECs, Polish shipyards were completely
State-owned and characterized by massive overca-
35 European Commission, “Framework on State aid to shipbuilding”
OJ 2011 C364/9. Yet, the Commission revises its Guidelines
continuously. The current framework came into force on
1.01.2012 and no longer contains any specific provisions related
to closure, employment or development aid as it has been provid-
ed by the previous version.
36 Case C 16/2004 “Hellenic Shipyards”, OJ 2009 L 225/104.
37 Case C 66/1998, C 46/1999 and C 6/2000 “Kvaerner Warnow
Werft”, OJ 2000 L 156/39; OJ 2000 L 120/12 and OJ 2005 L
120/21.
Figure 6: The European shipbuilding industry
Source: CESA Annual Report 2011/2012, Own Presentation.
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pacities and not competitive without public support.
Restructuring took place only after Poland joined the
EU and it involved massive financial support by the
Polish government. This clearly had attracted the at-
tention of the EU.
On 1st June 2005, the Commission published its
decision to open a formal investigation examining
State aidmeasures in favourof threePolish shipyards
in Gdynia,38 Gdansk,39 and Szczecin.40 Since 2002,
the shipyards have benefited from several aid mea-
sures such as capital injections, guarantees, loans,
and tax write-offs totalling several billions of Euros.
Contrary to other sectors, Poland, with its relatively
large shipbuilding industry, did not negotiate any
transitional arrangements for the applicationofState
aid rules to this sector. The investigation lasted more
than three years; the case was in the meantime also
negotiatedbetweenCommissionerKroesand thePol-
ish prime minister.41 In November 2008, the Com-
mission published its first two decisions coming to
the conclusion that the aid granted to Gdynia and
Szczecin constitute unlawful aid and subsequently
have to be repaid.
The two yards have been in difficulties since the
1990s. In April 2004, Poland notified restructuring
aid for the two yards whereupon the Commission
opened formal investigations in June 2005.42 As EU
State aid rules require such kind of aid to be based
on far-reaching restructuring plans, the Commission
required Poland to submit such restructuring plans,
which the government submitted with substantial
delay in September 2005 and September 2006. The
Commission came to the conclusion that none of the
plans would have ensured long-term viability of the
yardswhilst restructuringwould have been financed
entirely by State aid and not, as required, also by pri-
vate investments. In December 2006, Poland decid-
ed to privatise the shipyards, a process, delayed sev-
eral times, that finally led to potential investors sub-
mitting restructuring plans for the two yards on 12
September 2008. However, despite further large
amounts of State aid and substantial job losses fore-
seen in these plans, the Commission found that the
yards would still not have been commercially viable.
Hence, the subsidies received by the Gdynia and
Szczecin shipyards did not comply with the guide-
lines on R&R aid but were rather deemed to consti-
tute illegal operating aid. The Commission decision
required repayment of the illegal aid totalling €3.3
billion. Poland committed that the recovery will be
implemented by way of a sale of assets. However, no
investor was found and only a few assets of the ship-
yards could be sold. Thus, the repayment of unlaw-
ful aid never happened to any satisfying extent could
not have been complied with and the two shipyards
had to declare bankruptcy at the end of 2009.43
Croatia also has a noticable employment in the
shipbuilding industry. In 2011, the Croatian shipbuil-
dung industry employed 8.500 people and thus
ranked sixth in Europe (Figure 6). As it has been al-
ready the case for Poland, Croation shipyards were
State-owned and heavily subsidized by the govern-
ment (Figure 7). Thus, during Croatia’s EU accession
negotiations, the shipbuilding industry has been the
most critical subject in the negotiation chapters on
competition andState aid policy. Therefore, theCom-
mission required that Croatian shipyards needed to
be restructured, privatised, and the subsidies to be
phased out by the date of accession, 1 July 2013. Oth-
erwise, the Commission would order recovery of all
aid paid out ever since 2006.44 Consequently, the pri-
vatization process of the shipyards has been set into
operation.
For the yards of Brodosplit, Brodotrogir, and 3.Maj
private investorswere found.TheEuropeanCommis-
sion has authorised the restructuring plans and the
privatisation contracts for all three shipyards in dif-
ficulty. The amount of restructuring aid totalled
€1,028 million in case of Brodosplit, €408 million in
case of Brodotrogir, and €808 million for the yard
3.Maj. The share of own contribution of private in-
vestors were set between 40 and 67% of the total re-
structuring costs, which is in line with the required
minimum of 40%. Croatia increased the restructur-
ing aid for all yards, whichwas still authorised by the
EuropeanCommission. The increasewas justified by
Croatia with a higher number of employees, higher
38 Case C 17/2005 “Stoczni Gdynia”, OJ 2010 L33/1.
39 Case C 18/2005 “Stoczni Gdansk”, OJ 2010 L 81/19.
40 Case C 19/2005 “Szczecin Shipyard”, OJ 2010 L 5/1.
41 Blauberger op.cit., fn. 19.
42 See Commission Press Release No. 644/05, 1 June 2005.
43 In contrast, in July of 2009 the European Commission has autho-
rised the various support measures in favour of the Gdansk ship-
yard worth €251 million. The company had been successfully
privatised in 2007 to a Ukrainian industrial group (ISD).
44 Commission Decision of the Council of the European Union of
5 December 2011 on the admission of the Republic of Croatia to
the European Union, Annex VIII: “Commitments undertaken by
the Republic of Croatia on the restructuring of the Croatian ship-
building industry” OJ 2012 L 112/89.
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operational losses than predicted and unused capac-
ity. Yet, Croatia offered to further reduce the annual
production ceilings for the yards. The privatisation
contractsweresigned inFebruary,April andfor3.Maj
just in time on 1 July 2013, just allowing for comple-
tion of the privatisation process for all yards by 1 Ju-
ly 2013, the date of accession.
In sum, the cases of the shipbuilding industry re-
viewed here are cases in point to highlight in detail
the strict enforcement of State aid policy in the
CEECs. It became apparent that the EU Commission
executes strict State aid control in CEECs that even
extends to the period before accession to the EU and
adoption of the EU acquis communautaire.
VII. Conclusions
For theMembers States fromCentral andEasternEu-
rope, State aid is a sensitive issue in particular for
politicians and also for society at large: large employ-
ers, for which previously the State was responsible,
carry not only the largest burden in the process of in-
dustrial restructuring during transition to a market
economy. They also carry this burden over a much
longer period of time than smaller firms in the pri-
vatization process. The call to assist large employers
byway of extending previous state subsidies into the
process of transtion and even accession to the EU is
hence politically a pressing issue.
Still, once having entered the EU as full members,
the CEECs appear to have been converging into
rather stringent competition cultures: State aid may
well be slightly higher than in the oldMemberStates,
but comparative analysis does suggest that enforce-
ment has gradually become as effective and strict in
the East as is the case in the West, this despite the
rather different economic situations thatwould have
suggested that the pressure to use State aid is much
larger in East than West. An adjustment of State aid
in Croatia, which still exceeds the EU-average by 2.4
times is expected in the following years, as it has
been the case for the other CEECs. Our quantitative
analysis has also shown that State aid does assume
an increasingly horizontal character, in particular
with regional cohesion objectives. The share of for-
mal investigation procedures has fallen sharply in
CEECs and the share of negative decisions is lower
than in the West, as is notably the share of un-noti-
fied aid.
The additional analysis using the cases reviewed
herewasable to re-iterate thehypothesis that enforce-
ment of State aid policy in the CEECs is already strict
– and even included State aid paid out in the time be-
Figure 7: State aid to the Croatian shipbuilding industry
*Total Aid less Agriculture and Fisheries
Source: Annual Reports by the Croatian Competition Agency for 2009 and 2011.
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fore accession and the adoptionof theEUacquis com-
munautaire. No special treatment is granted to the
CEECs with their particular needs for industrial re-
structuring – the gloves are off. In fact, State aid en-
forcement has been rather draconic: the Polish ship-
yard example, where the inability of repayment of
aid thatwas ex-postdeemedunlawful has led to bank-
ruptcy and unemployment could hardly have been
more drastic.
We hence conclude that State aid in the newmem-
ber countries of the European Union is today not
grantedmore generously than amongst the oldmem-
bers, it appears not to be more targeted at individual
firms or industries. Our initial suspicion that State
aid enforcement may be rather more lax in the East
could not be corroborated, instead State aid policy
has become at least as strict as in theWest and a lev-
el playing field can today be assumed.
